Central to our national policy to combating terrorism is the
need to define the threat and understanding the enemy. “Terrorism” as a generic
concept is too vague and fluid to design a strategy against.
Moreover, terrorism, though often perceived
as a threat, is perhaps better characterized as a tactic or a process.
An
important point is that the strategic threat faced by India, is from an enemy
consisting of multiple groups with a variety of specific ideologies and with just
one stated objective, which is the downfall of democratic institutions of our Nation.
The enemy should not be bracketed as al- Qaeda or Taliban, since terrorism is
rapidly expanding to include all forms of radical ideology that is inspired in
part by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda philosophy and partly by instant gains
through violence. India’s strategy must be focused on dismantling known
terrorist networks inside the nation and, as a long term strategy, must prevail
over all ideologies (radical Islamic, Maoist, Naxal) that contribute to
terrorism.
Terror affects innocent people, spreads fear and is the
cause of some of the gravest violations of human rights and international law.
Terror must never be tolerated and can never be justified. It must be prevented
and combated, at both the national and the international level. Terror can
therefore be defeated by applying a broad range of measures: by improving
education, fostering inter-religious and sectarian understanding, by promoting economic
development, by establishing police reforms that lead to efficient policing and
judicial reforms for faster justice. And as a last resort, by use of force.
The fight against terrorism is ultimately a
struggle over values.
Our efforts to combat terrorism will only succeed if
they are in full accordance with the principles of the rule of law and
universal human rights. A strategic, comprehensive and broad national approach,
based on international cooperation with partner nations, and with a firm
emphasis on the fundamental values that we wish to defend, are the basic
requirements for our National Policy to combat terrorism.
A comprehensive national anti-terror policy must address
many issues. This will include appropriate roles for military, law enforcement,
intelligence, diplomacy, economic development, education, promotion of social
and political equality, and national institution building; within the context
of policies promoting national security.
Tactically, in
the short term, how does India employ the wide portfolio of tools available to
policymakers to reduce clear and immediate threats?
Strategically, in
the long term, how does India inspire the population towards nationalism and
reduce the influence of radicalization? In addition, a strategy ideally
attracts international allies. How does India maximize international
cooperation and national effectiveness?
In the period following the terrorist attacks on USA on
11 September 2001, international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction have emerged as the principle threats to International security.
Terrorists have since then destroyed innocent civilian lives across the globe. Terrorism
is a global threat and must be combated globally. This threat is omnipresent in
India where our citizens have been victims to terror attacks since 02 August
1984 (Meenambakkam bomb blast that killed 30) till the latest attack on 01 May
2014 (Chennai train bombing).
With 55 major terrorist attacks in last 30 years,
India is a front-line nation in the war against terrorism.
205 of the country’s 640 Districts continued
to be afflicted by varying intensities
of chronic subversive, insurgent and terrorist activity in 2013, including 120 Districts where the Maoists remained active;
20 Districts in J&K afflicted by Pakistan-backed Islamist separatist
terrorism; and 65 Districts in six Northeastern States where numerous ethnicity
based terrorist and insurgent formations operate.
The ‘National Policy to combat terrorism’ attempts to address
these issues:
The intent of this policy is to stop terrorist attacks
against India, its citizens, its interests, its friends and allies around the
world, as well as to create an international environment inhospitable to
terrorists and their supporters. The strategy emphasizes that all instruments
of national power; diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial,
information dissemination, intelligence, and military; are to be called upon in
combating international terrorism. The policy should fit into the wider
strategic concept of “defense-in-depth,” against terrorist attacks against India.
This national policy should complement other elements of our national strategy
including sub-strategies against weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks,
infrastructure protection, and narcotics control. The policy must focus on
identifying and eliminating threats before they reach the borders of India. A
strong preemptive component must be included in this policy, along-with a
strong focus on reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a
defense-in-depth framework to secure our Nation.
This threat looms over all countries and societies, and
as part of the global community India has an international obligation to fight
terrorism in line with the decisions of the United Nations (UN) as per the 2005
UN World Summit Outcome Document, in which member states condemned all
terrorism and declared it as the most serious threat to world peace and
international security.
India’s security policy must contain concentric
perimeters of security or ‘security rings’. The outermost will consist of
intelligence organizations and diplomats operating overseas. Their primary
objective should be to gather information that will pre-empt attacks on Indian
soil. The next inner perimeter should be a mix of Customs, Immigration, Coast
Guard and Border guards whose focus will be on the borders of India and the
goods and persons crossing through.
The next inner perimeter should be central and state
police, Home Guard, and allied services that function within the borders of our
Nation and are responsible for protecting our towns and cities. Private
Citizens can be inducted into this ring as informants and as civil guards. The
innermost ring should be a Public- Private Partnership between the private
sector and government departments to play a joint role in the protection of
critical infrastructures such as transport (land-sea-air), financial,
communications (mobile, broadband, TV, radio) and Power (electricity
generation).
The goal of this policy is to reach that state of
National protection, where the scope and capabilities of terrorism are reduced
to a non-entity. Once terrorists are isolated and localized, unorganized and
without powerful sponsors, they can be dealt with exclusively by the regular
police. Aspects of this policy will the emphasis on educational facilities and
school system, local and regional development in industrial and farm sectors
that directly benefit the local population, business friendly government
policies and poverty alleviation programs.
While there is no direct connection between poverty and terrorism; all
the above programs working in close cooperation with each other will reduce the
conditions that terrorist organizations exploit to attract and radicalize
recruits.
The
4D elements of anti-terrorism policy: Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend.
1.
Defeat terrorist by attacking their bases and
safe havens.
2.
Deny terrorists access to finances and state
sponsors.
3.
Diminish the social, financial and
educational conditions that terrorists exploit.
4.
Defend India’s citizens and interests at home
and abroad.
Given the unique circumstances that Pakistan as a ‘nation
state’ is sponsoring terrorists activities through its ISI (inter services
intelligence) across international borders into India, the Indian Government
must tailor a strategy to induce Pakistan to change its policies, eliminate
terrorist training camps inside Pakistan and deny to terror organizations
access to WMD material, sensitive military technology and funding sources from
illicit narcotic activities. In order to pressurize the Pakistani political
establishment to cooperate with India on its defense policy, India must take a
highly proactive role in Afghanistan. India has always enjoyed an ancient and
friendly relationship with Afghanistan. India has invested 11 billion dollars
in Afghanistan as of 2012-13. According to a 2010 Gallup poll, Afghan’s prefer
India’s leadership over that of USA or China, with 50% expressing approval, the
most positive ratings of India for any other surveyed Asia Pacific country.
India has made substantial financial investments in
Afghanistan and should now focus on a deep human footprint in the renewal of
its common cultural and social ties. One strategy may be to ‘adopt’ crucial
parts of Afghanistan over a 99 years period of lease to enable a massive effort
in Afghan rebuilding by reinforcing the financial investments with Indian
population that will assist in agricultural and industrial growth. This
populous foot-print can also allow Indian security forces to encircle and
isolate elements of Taliban and Al-Qaeda into local zones that will severely
restrict and cripple their operational capabilities.
The international community’s efforts following 11
September 2001attacks have shown that there are no simple solutions in the
fight against terrorism. Military force by itself is not sufficient. India must
apply a broad approach including political, legal, economic, diplomatic and
humanitarian efforts. In order to determine effective counter-measures against
terrorism, it is essential to have a deep understanding of how terrorist groups
operate, their financing and the motivation that drives them and their
supporters.
International
terrorism is dominated by Sunni Islamists groups linked to or inspired by Osama
bin Laden and the Al- Qaeda, which seeks to serve as the vanguard of religious
movement that inspires Muslims and others to join the “Jihadi” movement to help defend and purify Islam through violence.
According to bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa (religious
decree) it is the duty of Muslims around the world to wage a holy war on
Americans, Jews and Unbelievers (of Islamic faith). Muslims who do not heed
this fatwa are declared apostates
(those who have forsaken their Muslim faith). Interestingly, Al- Qaeda’s
ideology of ‘Jihadism’ is marked by
willingness to kill Shiite Muslims along with the apostate. With its emphasis
on jihad, “jihadism” has its roots in
the work of two Sunni Islamic thinkers; Mohammed
Ibn Abd al- Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb.
Al- Wahhab was an 18th
century reformer who claimed that Islam had been corrupted
within a generation after the death of Prophet Mohammed. He denounced any
theology or customs developed after that as non- Islamic, including more than
few centuries of religious scholarship. He and his supporters have deep roots
in what is today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; where “wahhabism” remains the dominant religious thought.
Sayyid Qutb; a radical Egyptian scholar
of the mid- 20th century declared that Western (liberal) civilization as the enemy of
Islam. He denounced Muslim nations for deviating from the path of “true Islam” and taught that jihad should be undertaken – not just to
defend Islam, but to purify it.
It
is important that India works as one nation to reduce popular support for
terrorist groups and at the same time fight and destroy known terrorist
networks. This seems to be the best way of limiting recruitment from within
India, across the borders from Pakistan and from other Muslim countries and
communities.
The
past few years have shown that armed conflict in Muslim countries and also in
countries where Muslims are minorities; gives rise to renewed resentment within
the Muslim communities and attracts terrorists from other countries. Apart from long term policies towards
reducing poverty, implementing of good governance, transparent administration,
access to schooling, drinking water, social and economic programs that will
reduce radicalization of youth and reduce the support to terrorism, Indian
security agencies must focus on the inherent principles of law-enforcement,
these being:
(i)
Intelligence gathering and analysis, both foreign
and domestic,
(ii)
Law Enforcement, the application of legal strictures
without fear or favor,
(iii)
Economic security, the protection of critical
infrastructure and financial institutions, and
(iv) Curbing the flow of Terrorist finances, by
curtailing money laundering and seizing terrorist funds and assets of the
funding sponsors.
In
addition to the above, India must decide on a massive policy change from the
current one to establish civilian- military outreach program to tactically
support the multi-pronged strategy of financial, social and human assistance to
our neighboring countries and others in similar needs, through which India can
send out humanitarian aid and development aid that is fully protected by its
military strength; across the globe.
Given
the potential to access WMDs by terrorist groups, it is a great challenge to
design effective responses to various terror threats. Governments and law
makers are constantly under pressure to effectively combat this growing global
phenomenon with sufficient support from Intelligence networks and at
sustainable levels of economic, social and political costs.
(a)
How to protect personal freedom and civil liberties while enhancing security
and
(b) How
to control the ever-increasing costs of growing levels of security.
Critical to both these issues will be
the development of a methodology that measures the effectiveness of
anti-terrorism efforts within the parameters of social and economical costs. There
will always be difficult choices in allocating limited resources and ensuring
risk-based priorities for assets that need protection, such allocations being
based on strict assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. This is based on a premise that such vulnerability assessment methods
already exist or can be developed, that are able to assess terrorist risk. There
is also the issue over the potential for limitless economic cost of security,
associated with defense of our motherland. No nation can afford the cost of
securing every square kilometer of its territory from attacks; therefore there
will always be a need for a policy that must allocate resources for
anti-terrorism and national defense on a prioritized basis. To complicate matters further, governments and
terrorists may be fighting “different” wars. Lawmakers view success against
terrorism in terms of minimizing physical damage, death and injury to citizens
and destruction of property, and concentrate their energy and resources to
these areas. The terrorists; on the other hand, while seeking massive physical
damage and wanton loss of life, view the success of their attacks in abstract,
ideological terms. Their focus is the impact of their actions on further recruitment
to their ranks, its effect on government policies and stability of the
government and the impact on the economy of the target nation.
Terrorists try
to get an advantage over the behavioral patterns of the population and attempt to generate public pressure on the
government in power, to pursue policies that appease the terrorists*. The
crucial question that arises is, how long can a democratic government pursue
policies that pressurize terrorists if such policies seem to attract terrorist
retaliation? Weakening and breaking this political will is the central goal of
any terrorist activity.
*[The Kandhar (Afghanistan 1999) incident
where release of hostages against exchange of previously arrested crucial
terrorist assets, including highly motivated and indoctrinated terrorist
leaders; led to low morale, open drift in policy and weakness in political
leadership, which led the terrorists to escalate terrorist violence, including
an attack on the Parliament of India (2001) and successful strikes on numerous
other targets at their whim and choice, while the Indian security community was
in a constant state of general pessimism, lack of confidence and indignity].
Our national policy should have the flexibility to
strategise an anti-terrorist response based on the situations. One potential
danger of a “formalized and non-flexible” strategy; is that it may rigidly
dictate a response instead of the threat dictating the response; and in
terrorist attacks, the threat is always rapidly evolving. Lawmakers have to
ensure that the policy to combat terrorism has flexibility in its strategies,
organizational structure and utilization of funds. Other factors that are
equally critical and necessary for success; are a strong national leadership,
professional and proficient rank-and-file personnel, cutting edge technology,
as well as strong political will of leadership, and national pride among the
general population. One potential pitfall of relying on strategies and reforms involving
restructuring of government organizations is that a focus on implementing strategies
or administrative changes may overshadow other important factors, such as quality
of personnel and technology. In particular, this human factor may warrant more
attention in an environment where organizations may feel pressed to find additional
trained personnel to fill a plethora of newly created anti-terrorism related
positions.
Historically, the lessons from the fiasco at Kandahar brutally reminded India that all its strength
in conventional and strategic forces did not necessarily add up to overcome the
leadership challenge which; combined with a series of real-time tactical errors
characterized by an intensely risk averse and bureaucratic decision-making
process, and by the extreme lack of accountability of systems, established a
legacy of capitulation and extreme willingness to accept soft options. The
Indian response demonstrated unambiguously that strategic goals tended to be
ignored or pushed to the background by political posturing and ephemeral,
rhetorical, highly questionable and whimsical policies, unfortunately thrust
upon the nation in an arbitrary fashion.
The Nation must have the central theme
of using all elements of national power in combating terrorism. The emphasis is
on the core importance of timely intelligence that leads to demonstrative
action. Our national policy must include a need for pre-emptive strategy, for
attacks on terrorist bases and facilities, for ensuring committed international
cooperation, strengthening efforts to control and prohibit non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, attacking terrorist financing and financer assets
(including Hawala systems and Hawala operators), denying safe havens to
terrorist across the globe and securing the Nation’s borders by projecting them
internationally.
The policy has to be forward looking.
Terrorists are no longer found only in failed states or poverty stricken
nations. With numerous active battle fields to be trained in and to avail
on-the-ground experience; terrorists are increasingly returning to their
politically stable home countries for safe sanctuaries, where they blend into
the local communities, establish training and indoctrination camps in mosques
and community centers and bomb factories in private residences.
Preventing the growth of radical Islamic
extremism is another major policy decision. Central to combating this extremism
are the issues of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted and
facilitated by the action of individuals and nations. Another issue is the
impact of poverty in recruitment by terrorist organizations. The link between
poverty and terrorism is not evident. However, efforts in the fight against
poverty will help in the prevention of terrorism. This applies particularly
towards efforts in infrastructure development, easy access to education,
equitable distribution of income and profit, good governance and transparent
administration. The question does arise, as to what degree is it economically
sustainable to raise the standard of living to that levels; where social,
ethnic, religious, economic and political grievances’ do not explode into
terrorist movements or terrorist activities? The leader of modern terrorism,
Osama bin Laden was a billionaire, as are many of his financial supporters.
Strategies and Tactics:
Every nation faces its ‘moment-of-truth’
when different strategic styles, tactics and capabilities have different end
results. Divergent challenges, decisions and responses have dramatic and
lasting impacts on the nation’s anti-terrorism doctrines and general psyche. A
‘hard’ response of striking at the terrorists, extracting innocents from the
conflict area and execution of all directly involved terrorists (or their
capture) can influence post- incident national reaction of dynamic optimism and
confidence in the administration; while a ‘soft’ option of negotiation and
submission to terrorist demands will result in low morale, non-confidence in
administration, escalated terrorist attacks, and increasing terrorist demands. A
hard response reflects that the military and strategic supremacy of the State
cannot be challenged easily by terrorists, without the possibility of harsh
retaliation. A soft response is always the hallmark of a faction ridden
political system, incoherent and uncoordinated police procedures, weak
intelligence gathering apparatus and overall an unaccountable and whimsical
leadership in moments of crisis.
‘Lessons not learnt and refused to be learnt’ is the easiest way for a State to lose its identity, and
grip on the political control of the Nation.
Regardless of the various varieties of philosophies
offered by terrorists in justification of their actions, their single purpose
is political control by violence and intimidation. Radical Islam and its
practitioners never try to negotiate the outcome of hostile situation exclusively
by dialogue, but prefer the tactics of dialogue through brutal violence to
achieve victory in their immediate and long term objectives. India must ensure
that our anti-terror policy is recognizable and predictable over time; as hard,
non-negotiable and retaliatory. Our policy should support the development of an
effective framework for combating terrorism, ensure that it complies with
international law and respect for human rights, supports conflict resolution
and reconciliation, fosters understanding between religions and sectarian
communities, promotes peace and civil security, detects and prevents the
proliferation of WMDs, strengthens internal and international police and
security services cooperation, and prevents terrorism financing.
Combating the financing of terrorism is
an important element in the fight against terrorism and is an area that
requires international cooperation. In 2004, the World Bank and IMF were given
a specific mandate to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. India has
supported this initiative along-with implementing the recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on combating terrorism financing. The FATF
is an international working group that was established in 1989 following an
initiative of the G7 countries. India must lead the efforts to ensure the
implementation of FATF’s recommendations in neighboring countries of Pakistan,
Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, to prevent
these countries from financing terrorism.
Saudi Arabia is accused as the world's largest
source of funds for Salafi jihadist terrorist militant groups, such as al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, Pakistan Taliban, ISIS and Lashkar-e-Taiba in South Asia, and donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the
most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide,
according to Hillary
Clinton. According to a secret December
2009 paper signed by the US secretary of state, "Saudi Arabia remains a
critical financial support base for al-Qaida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups."
The United Nations (UN) 1267 committee
under the Security Council keeps a list of persons, groups, enterprises, and
other entities connected with Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This
and the UN Security Council resolution 1373 on preventing financial support for
terrorist groups, preventing terrorists groups from seeking refuge, freezing
assets that belong to terrorists, sharing information on terrorist groups,
cooperating on investigations and prosecution, criminalizing any participation
in and support of terrorism; can be utilized to design a internationally
acceptable national policy towards anti- terrorism. India can also request
increased support from the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) in
its anti-terrorism policy and strategies. There should be increased
participation in Security Council resolution 1566 aimed at identifying methods
to ensure that sanctions against terrorist groups can be made more effective
and for expanding the UN’s list to cover organizations not connected with
Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. With the ever increasing number of European citizens,
originating mostly from African / North African countries, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Afghanistan and few from India; it is necessary that India develops
a close working relationship with OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe) whose field operations are strong in the EU, Scandinavia and Easter
European countries.
International cooperation in the
intelligence and terrorist prosecution sector is extremely important for
combating terrorist networks, preventing attacks and, detaining and prosecuting
terror suspects.
Terrorist groups finance part of their
activities through organized crime like distribution of illegal narcotics,
smuggling of firearms and human slave trade. Strategies and methods to prevent
such crimes are important part of the anti- terrorism efforts. In the same
manner, it is important to establish effective international procedures for
combating crime that is related to terrorism.
It is essential that Indian security and
intelligence services are closely coordinated and extensively trained to enable
them to develop an expertise on international terrorism. This is necessary in
order to make them valued partners in the broader framework of international
cooperation and to enable them to better analyze and interpret information from
global sources.
This policy paper attempts to
set out the potential overall goals of India’s efforts in the fight against
terrorism, both on the national and international front, to prevent and combat
terrorism effectively and efficiently. As part of this policy, India’s efforts
should be more focused on:
Ø Increase the ability and opportunities to play a proactive
role in the international arena of the fight against terrorism.
Ø Increase the overall abilities to rapidly adapt to changing
terrorist scenarios and coordinate measures in consultation with UN, OSCE and
other international partners.
Ø Ensure that India’s international effort is relative to its
domestic efforts and national experience and priorities, as is appropriate from
time-to-time.
As underlined in this policy paper,
India should give particular priority to a long-term national policy to
prevent, control and defeat terrorist activities in-country and internationally.
Furthermore, India must take a proactive role in its assistance to the
neighboring countries of SAARC in the fight against terrorism by developing
stronger and detailed bilateral cooperation programs.
“This is a concept
paper and does not in any manner attempt to state the actual policy to combat
terrorism by the Union of India or its elected Government”.
