In current times, Daesh
is not the only Islamic terrorist organization that has to be fought and
defeated. The older partners in the business of Islamic terrorist activities
are Al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and while Al-Qaeda is out of the spot-light after
the death of its founder Osama Bin Laden, it is now slowly resurging in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is working on long term strategies and
building alliances. It’s keeping its activities under-the-radar and its intensions
secret, making it difficult to track down its operatives and assess the threat
that it poses. Al-Qaeda may have decided in this present time to focus on
regional issues inside Afghanistan and help the Taliban on the ground; but that
does not mean that they can be discounted as a threat for any future attacks
they might be plotting abroad; especially against the Western countries.
Afghan observers say al-Qaeda activity in that country
has decreased after years of drone strikes. That matches with a general
analysis that described an exodus of “key al-Qaeda personnel” from Afghanistan
and Pakistan to the Middle East. While the group would probably remain active
in Afghanistan, the report predicted, “the future strategic direction of
core Al Qaeda will likely align more closely with dynamics in the Levant,”
a reference to a stronghold al-Qaeda has carved out amid the chaos of the
Syrian civil war. But al-Qaeda will
never disappear from Afghanistan and will keep reappearing in different forms.
That, say some experts, who study al-Qaeda; is exactly
what the group is doing in Afghanistan, switching its focus from a small group
of foreign operatives secretly planning global attacks to a larger, newer
regional subgroup, called al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Founded in 2014,
the Indian Subcontinent subgroup has sometimes been dismissed as “not real al-Qaeda,”
in part because it is composed mostly of locals, not the Arabs who fill many of
al-Qaeda’s top positions. While most senior al-Qaeda personnel are trying to
hide from the US surveillance, the subgroup members are “more active” and are
focused on training new Taliban recruits. Divining the true intentions and capabilities
of a particular branch of a covert group like al-Qaeda has always been difficult
and “subjective” and always will be, until the day they execute an attack in
the world.
In contrast to the laid-back approach of these Jihadi
organizations; the Taliban has seized Afghanistan from the USA and is now fully
in control of the entire country. Today, the Taliban govern the lives of tens of millions
of Afghans living under their rule. Taliban governance is more coherent than
ever before; where high-level commissions govern sectors such as finance,
health, education, justice and taxation, with clear chains of command and
policies from the leadership down to villages in Afghanistan.
Its
rival, Daesh has established a local affiliate, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, which is challenging the Taliban
government for territory and influence. In Pakistan, the group has showcased
its presence and influence by conducting deadly attacks on soft targets. Recently,
On 18 June 2022
Islamic State terrorists attacked the Gurudwara Karte Parwan in Kabul,
Afghanistan with explosives and gun-fire. One Sikh devotee was killed and two
are badly injured. The two IS attackers were killed by the Taliban.
Daesh
survived the loss of its territory in Iraq / Syria by converting its physical caliphate to virtual
one, with the message to followers – “stay in your society and we will help
you / instruct you to create havoc in your own localities”, which is the first
challenge of the future. It must be remembered that the “original message” to
followers was that the caliphate is a perfect place to live with the laws being
clear and indisputable, since they were supposedly framed by Prophet Mohammed
on the instructions of Allah.
The challenge is: how do democratic
governments prevent someone from being radicalized online and more importantly,
how do you find out who is being radicalized online?
The primary causes of any
extremism are;
- Fear of being persecuted or wronged,
- loss of identity,
- economic
hardship,
- deep sympathy with religious causes, and
- a set of perceived
grievances.
The Origins of Al-Qaeda and Daesh
The origins of Al-Qaeda
are a result of ‘Operation Cyclone’; a program carried out by the American
clandestine agency, the CIA; that armed and funded the ‘Mujahedin’ in
Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The origins of Daesh, and
more importantly its growth; are the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq
in 2003 and the fall of the Saddam regime. Originally founded by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi as the Group for Monotheism and Jihad, Daesh became known as
al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and later the Islamic State, after the withdrawal of
U.S. troops. Daesh was disowned by al-Qaeda in April 2013 for excess brutality
toward civilians and the murder of al-Qaeda representatives and commanders. On
June 30, 2014 they declared themselves a ‘Sunni caliphate’ with al-Bagdadi as
the “Commander of the Faithful,” a term essentially declaring him leader of all
Muslims. He was later killed in a U.S. drone attack, as was his successor.
To
understand the origins, impact and the future of Daesh, the focus of research
and analysis should be on multiple levels. The beginning should be with the
Ideology of Daesh and its intellectual origins, and connections to al- Qaeda,
Salafis, and Salafi-Jihadi groups. The complexity of Daesh needs to be understood
through the factors that created it; its dependency on the religious texts
through which it projects its unique identity, its barbaric and ruthless
approach to jihad, and its rigid and seemingly unwavering ideological
interpretations of Sharia; its psychological approach of sectarian dominance,
and its extreme brutality towards all those it considers as its rivals or the
infidels and apostates.
The Role of Pakistan as a Terrorist Sponsor
The United States and allies have long been frustrated
with Pakistan’s persistent acquiescence to safe havens for the Afghan Taliban
and its vicious Haqqani branch in Pakistan. Worse yet, Pakistan has provided
direct military and intelligence aid to both groups, resulting in the deaths of
Western soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and civilians, plus significant
destabilization of Afghanistan. Pakistan has long been a difficult and
disruptive neighbor to Afghanistan, hoping to limit India’s influence there,
and cultivating radical groups within Afghanistan as proxies. The main reason is
that Pakistan depends on the theory, that the Taliban will maintain its
government in Afghanistan; and does not want to alienate it. After all, the
Taliban is Pakistan’s only ally among Afghanistan’s political actors, however
reluctant and unhappy the relationship maybe. The ongoing battles between the
Taliban and the Pakistani forces reflects the friction between these two with the
Pakistani military wanting to control Taliban and through it the Afghanistan
government itself, and the Taliban government trying to disassociate itself
from its former masters and sponsors.
Pakistan further fears that its long refusal to fully
sever support for these groups will high-light its lack of full control over
the militant groups that it has sponsored, even though the Pakistani military will
never admit it. Such a disclosure of weakness would be costly: reducing the
omnipotent image of Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus with respect to
varied domestic audiences, including opposition politicians, and further
encouraging misbehavior of militant groups. And while such a disclosure may
somewhat reduce international pressure on Pakistan, it would also weaken
Pakistan’s hand in international bargaining. Pakistan is also afraid of a
strong Taliban government with informal trade-ties with India, potentially
helping to encircle Pakistan. The paranoia cannot end unless the
military-intelligence apparatus loses its predominant power in the Pakistani
government and becomes subordinated to an enlightened, capable, and accountable
civilian leadership.
Battleground
Bangladesh
Bangladesh is another prime breeding ground for Daesh. It has the fourth
largest Muslim population that very poor and Daesh has shown a keen interest in
securing a presence there, due to its potential pool of recruits in large
numbers and a porous border with India. Interestingly, the first Bangladeshi Islamist militant factions
emerged long ago in 1989, when a network of 30 different factions was
established and expanded in the following years. The main goal of most Islamist
groups in Bangladesh is to
create a separate Islamic state,
or to govern Bangladesh
according to Sharia law. Bangladesh has
experienced significant terrorism conducted by a number of radical local
Islamist organizations. Islamic
extremist militant organizations have risen to prominence through
assassinations, hostage takings and bomb attacks. Both Daesh and Al-Qaeda in
the Indian Subcontinent have claimed to be active in the country, although the
Bangladeshi government believes that they mainly operate through local
affiliates.
When compared to his peers in the
terrorism community, Akayed Ullah was most certainly a loser. The amateur
jihadist attempted to blow himself up at the New York City port authority bus
terminal by strapping a pipe bomb to his body. But the bomb, made with
firecracker powder and lit with a Christmas candle was so low intensity that,
far from creating widespread terror, he didn’t even end up killing himself. In
the weeks that have followed since, the 27-year-old Bangladeshi migrant has
received more ridicule than fear or praise. Ullah’s attempt gained widespread
media attention in the West because of its location: New York City. But a look at
the trend of Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh will show that he isn’t the only
one who’s tried the fedayeen format in recent times. He’s in fact part
of a growing tribe of martyrdom seekers that has been emerging since 2016.
Until 2016, all of the violence had
been restricted to their home ground; nothing was attempted overseas. Even
large Islamist terror groups of the previous decades, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al
Islami Bangladesh for example, had been homegrown outfits. They shared training
links with Pakistan-based Kashmir-centric outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammed and
Lashkar-e-Taiba, and they received funding from overseas. But both their
membership and their political goals remained focused on Bangladesh. But this
reality changed in 2016.
For the new generation, the
injustices of Iraq and the dream of building a Caliphate in Syria were what
inflamed their passions. The Islamic State replaced al-Qaeda in Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS) as the brand to which they now swore their loyalty. This
organizational change coincided with an attitude shift toward fighting. Where
Islamists of previous decades had been content with killing in the name of
religion, the millennial militant wants to die for it. Unlike fanatics of past
decades, the new attackers aren’t schooled in madrasas imparting religious
education. Instead, similar to iconic Islamic State militants like Muhammad
Jassim Abdulkarim Olayan al-Dhafiri (aka Jihadi John) and or Siddhartha Dhar
(aka Abu Rumaysah al-Britani), these young Bangladeshi men hail from well-to-do
families and have had access to expensive English language higher education
much of their lives. Most have lived overseas for extended periods of time and
have had direct exposure to Western culture and liberal values. Following his
arrest, Ullah said he was inspired by the Islamic State and was seeking revenge
for U.S. air raids on Mosul. From investigations thus far, it is clear that he
did not hold any formal membership or post with the Iraqi-Syrian outfit. In
fact, he doesn’t even appear to have been in touch with Bangladeshi terror
groups. The only known operative of the Islamic State in Bangladesh who
actually traveled to Syria was the so-called emir of Bengal, Tamim Chowdhury.
Due to their proximity to the
Pakistani military and intelligence establishment, the older South Asian
jihadist outfits, mostly Kashmir-centric groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and
Jaish-e Muhammad followed military-like command chains with handlers, trainers,
and operatives.
The new groups of younger jihadis
spread out across the Asian continent; are far more decentralized,
non-hierarchical, and rely on the internet for everything associated with jihad.
This decentralization makes the Islamic State in South Asia operationally much
cheaper than traditional outfits and allows the flexibility to quickly adapt to
changing pressures from government forces. The reliance on the internet and
messaging apps makes tracing and tracking much more difficult. Providing
propaganda, inspiration, and tutorials through shareable videos, audio sermons,
e-magazines, and other digital content is the main trade of the Islamic State
in South Asia. There is next to no coercion or monetary compensation.
Individuals go from being the boy/girl next door to a terrorist almost entirely
on their own effort. All the Islamic State does is provide a template to which
vulnerable individuals mold themselves and content which inspires and educates.
This has become a pattern of sorts in Bangladesh.
Two groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen
Bangladesh and Ansarul Islam, dominate Bangladesh’s jihadist landscape today,
with a faction of the former appears to have consolidated links to the Islamic
State (ISIS); while the latter is affiliated with al-Qaeda’s South Asian
branch. The influx of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s
Rakhine state in August-December 2017 also raises security concerns for Bangladesh.
Jihadist groups, including ISIS and Pakistani militants have referenced the
Rohingya’s plight in efforts to mobilize support. For now, though, little
suggests that the refugees are particularly susceptible to jihadist
recruitment.
Kashmir
– The Next Battleground?
In early February 2016, the Islamic
State announced its intention to expand into Kashmir as part of its broader
Khorasan branch. One of the causes of concern associated with the spread of the
Islamic State affiliate in Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) is the existing instability
within the region due to the presence of three prominent militant groups; the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
which historically have been linked to elements of the Pakistani state and
largely favor Pakistan. Historically, such groups have tended to pursue either
a separatist, or a pro-Pakistan agenda, and it is only more recently that trans-national
terrorist outfits such as the Islamic State have attempted to infuse the Kashmiri
jihad with pan-Islamist ideology.
The presence of Islamic State in
J&K progressed gradually during 2017, starting with reports of Islamic
State flags being waved during rallies and protests around the valley. While
this claim is still pending official verification, Islamic State’s Amaq news
agency claimed responsibility for an attack in Srinagar on November 17, 2017,
which killed an Indian policeman. The militant killed in the attack, Mugees
Ahmed Mir, is suspected to have been inspired by the Islamic State’s online
propaganda and was found wearing an Islamic State T-shirt at the time of the
attack. For the most part, though, signs of ISJK’s existence have largely been
observed in the online realm alone. Since late 2017, the pro-Islamic State
J&K-focused media group Al-Qaraar has engaged in a social media campaign,
directing messages tailored to inspire a Kashmiri audience. Although videos and
pictures are a part of ISJK’s online effort, more substantive materials have
also been produced. The more detailed writings distributed by Al-Qaraar
entitled “Realities of Jihad in Kashmir and Role of Pakistani Agencies” and
“Apostasy of Syed Ali Shah Gheelani and others” provide deeper insights into
the nature of the jihad that
the Islamic State seeks to promote amongst Kashmiri followers. The first
article argues that the struggle in Kashmir has not been guided by Islam, but
rather by Pakistan and its agents. In contrast to the first piece that focuses
on the general insincerity of Pakistan, the other document names and shames
specific leaders such as Sayeed Ali Shah Geelani of the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC). According to the Al-Qaraar article, Geelani is a kafir
since he believes in democracy, seeks the judgment of the United Nations, a
“false god,” and considers Shia community to be Muslims. Similarly, the
document criticizes Yasin Malik, the chairman of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF).
Given the present limitations on
data regarding actual ISJK followers, evaluating ISJK’s online propaganda
against the current ground realities in J&K suggests that the group’s goals
are ambitious at the very least. Yet, it would be unwise to completely dismiss
the threat associated with the potential popularity of ISJK’s ideology. ISJK’s
social media campaign indicates that its goal is not to win the hearts and
minds of Kashmir’s hardened militants. Rather, its pan-Islamist message and
extensive use of social media suggests that ISJK seeks to inspire the new
generation of tech-savvy Kashmiris who may be dissatisfied with the status quo
but have yet to engage in militancy. While existing J&K militant groups do
recruit locally, they also include a large proportion of fighters from
Pakistani provinces outside of Kashmir. For example, a study of 1,625 biographies
of slain Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen [HM]
militants found that 89 percent of LeT militants and 33 percent of HM militants
were of Pakistani, non-Kashmiri origin. Thus, it would make sense for ISJK to
aim to recruit the younger generation of Kashmiris to inspire a new movement
that is more indigenous, more pan-Islamist, and less pro-Pakistan. Indeed,
there may be opportunities for this; reports show that increasing numbers of
young Kashmiri fighters are joining armed separatists, which may effectively
change the overall ratio of local Kashmiri jihadis; to jihadis from outside of
Kashmir. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, who was killed in July 2016,
gained massive popularity through his extensive use of social media, which
helped increase the group’s numbers. His successor, Zakir Musa, however, left
the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda’s affiliate in
J&K, making clear his intention to fight for Islam rather than for the
independence of Kashmir or mergence with Pakistan. His message ran parallel to
that of ISJK and unfortunately this suggests that there may be a fresh pool of
recruits for ISJK to tap into to trigger a more indigenous movement, especially
given the young demographic makeup of the Kashmir valley and high unemployment
rates. The real threat lies in ISJK effectively radicalizing Kashmiri youth via
its social media campaign and coordinating activity through digital networks,
which can give way to heightened terrorism, extreme tactics, and sectarian attacks.
On 11 July 2021, the Indian intelligence
agencies arrested Umar Nisar Bhat and two of his associates who were residents
of Anantnag district of J&K, for conspiring to radicalize and recruit youth
from India into #Daesh, to wage jihad against India. Umar Nisar, aka Qasim
Khorasani is one of the founding members of the ISJK. The NIA (National
Investigations Agency) have been able to connect these arrests to #Daesh in
Afghanistan. There is a growing concern that Islamic State terrorists are
operating from various conflict zones with its cadres that include Indians, and
this can create a network that can be used to radicalize and recruit new members.
In early May, the NIA has claimed
that the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence of the Pakistan Army) had
called a meeting of terrorist group commanders from Hizbul, Lashkar and others;
to create a ‘coordination group’ so that these terrorist groups could
coordinate with each other and carry out targeted attacks, primarily against
India. The commanders were specifically advised to reconnect with ex-militants
and Over-Ground-Veterans in the Kashmir valley, to ensure easy transport of
funds, weapons and ideology, and to recruit local Kashmiri youth to undertake
attacks in the valley. ISJK and Ansar Gazwat-ul-Hind were recruited for this
effort. New terrorists’ groups like The Resistance Front, Muslim Janbaz Force,
and the Kashmir Janbaz Force were created in an attempt to prove that the
terrorism was home-grown in Kashmir and had no connections to Pakistan. Investigation
has further revealed that since its existence, The Resistance Front (TRF)
executed various terrorist attacks in the Valley by using small weapons in
order to carry out targeted killings and escape easily depicting the cadres as
‘faceless force’,” the NIA said.
The NIA further claimed that the
ISI had put pressure on the commanders of terrorist organizations to ensure the
spread of terrorism in Kashmir and to show-case it to the world as a ‘home-grown
resistance’ against the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir. Every terrorist
activity in Kashmir over the last year can be traced to this ‘coordination
group’ and the Pakistani ISI.
By: Sardar Sanjay Matkar
June 2022.
