The Taliban’s agility and ability to adapt has been remarkable. Their gradual acceptance to the fact that unrestricted violence would hurt their quest for popular support, transformed into sophisticated policy planning and implementation of developmental activities. Step-by-step, they revived and re-started parts of their governance, and invented other systems through trial and error. Much of this process appears to be from the ground-up and influenced by popular demand and local experiences. Their leadership also proceeded to correct many of the flaws and shortcomings that undermined their rule in the 1990s. The ban on women and girls attending school has been removed, though most Taliban officials claim that no ban ever existed, and have publicly stated that women should have access to education. The ban on opium cultivation and its trade, which was a disaster during their earlier government times is clearly no longer in place, but the Taliban do not publicize this shift in policy and down-play the opium connection in public. Other subtle differences are their stated respect for other ethnic groups and their embrace of technology, limited as it may be. Circumstances have radically changed for the Taliban since 2001, and their policies and goals have shifted accordingly. Far from being a revolutionary movement of the 1990s, prior to 2022, they considered themselves as a deposed government and the main armed opposition fighting the pro-Western government supported by foreign soldiers. The Taliban leadership itself has also been transformed. Circumstances have forced them to travel outside their villages and also outside the country at times, and they have learned from their travels.
The simple fighters of yester-years are worldly trained politicians today; transforming themselves from being traditional conservatives into modern Islamist's. They have also become better at managing external perceptions, having realized that appearing as educated people is an advantage and it is helpful in manipulating the media. They have become sophisticated; with professional-standard glossy publications, a website in several languages, videos made of high-quality production and highly capable spokesmen that respond rapidly to questions and criticism across social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp; even though what is publicized on the social media is vastly different from the ground reality in Afghanistan. What exactly do the changes in Taliban policy means for Afghans and the future of Afghanistan will depend on the critical study and analysis of their on-ground actions. The Taliban are led by the Emir ul-Mumenin (leader of the faithful), currently Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada. The scope and complexity of this position varies according to the person who occupies it, and the current Emir’s functions are more spiritual and political, than as an operational military commander. He is assisted by two deputies, as well as the leadership shura. At the provincial level there is a governor, appointed officially by the leadership shura. The Taliban now has a quasi–professional core of individuals who have served for several years across multiple provinces. These governors and local councils / commissions are not completely ‘civilian’, and the governors may serve in military capacity to varying degrees depending on the context and broader requirements of the office for local governance. Provincial ministers are appointed by the leadership of the relevant council, viz: education, health and finance; in consultation with the governor of the province. The system has grown more comprehensive over the years, with a dozen committees, some with multiple departments covering a multitude of issues. Significant autonomy is granted to province and district level officials within the overall framework of the policy.
This flexibility is intentional, in order to accommodate different views and reducing dissent to as little as possible. It also helps to prevent the Taliban from splitting into different factions; since local politics and preferences based on history play a significant role in governance. Some areas might have a higher demand for health services than others, while others might want to give priority to education. The extent to which services have been available in the past also matters. Areas where customary structures of governance are influential and respected, are in a stronger position to bargain for amenities from the Taliban officials. Individual relationships also influence policies, although the Taliban does not generally welcome individual opinions, since such interactions could be perceived as corruption. In practice however, the Taliban rely on relationships in every aspect of their governance, due to a lack of trust in general and the widespread suspicion of their motives by the locals and the international interlocutors. Arrangements between the Taliban and civilians are based on a mutual yet unequal exchange, leading to an informal social contract that renders to the Taliban a legitimate authority, and strengthening its credibility as an acceptable form of government; even though it is not a government based on the choice and free will of the people of Afghanistan.
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