The “Aden” policy - Why Bharatvarsh (India) cannot ignore the Yemen war.
The ongoing conflict in Yemen has been in infrequently reported in our local media and finds little to no mention in the government’s foreign policy briefings. Yet, this region near East Africa that is considered to be technically a part of Asia, and its long-standing internal strife and latest on-going international conflict should be of primary concern to us.
Let us briefly look at the history of Yemen to understand the historical background of the current conflict.
For more than 2,000 years prior to the arrival of Islam on its soil, Yemen was home to rich city-states and wealthy empires whose prosperity was based on their control over the production of Frankincense (an aromatic gum resin containing volatile oils used in incense and perfumes) and Myrrh (a bitter tasting, aromatic oleoresinous gum); two of the most highly prized commodities of the ancient world, and Yemen’s then exclusive access to spices and condiments from southern Asia and Ivory from East Africa. Of the three most known and largest empires spanning from 1200 BCE to 525 CE; the empire of Saba (also known as Sheba), finds a prominent mention in the Bible.
The Roman empire began expanding its power and influence to the Red Sea in 1st century CE and soon learned how to utilize the monsoon winds to enable sea traffic between Red Sea ports and ports of Asia and East Africa. Unable to compete with the Romans, it was only a matter of time before Yemen went into an economic decline and also into a vortex of political and social instability. In 6th century CE, the last king of the Himyarite empire Dhu Nuwas (a convert to Judaism) massacred the majority of the Christian population of Yemen. In retaliation, the Byzantine emperor arranged to have an army from the Christian kingdom of Aksum (in what is today’s Ethiopia) to invade Yemen and aid the Christian survivors. The Aksumite campaign was lead by Abraha, who won this war and stayed on to rule Yemen. He attempted to expand his newly acquired kingdom farther north into the Hejaz (currently the western region of Saudi Arabia), and while his effort to besiege Mecca was a failure, it achieved him a mention in the Koran. The defeated Himyarites sought the support of the Persian Sasanian dynasty to overthrow the Aksumites, and after obliging them, the Persians added Yemen to their domain. In 628 CE, the Persian Governor of Yemen converted to Islam.
Islam spread quickly in Yemen, perhaps due to its consistent economic decline and the atrocious behaviour of both the Jewish and Christian rulers during those times. Early in the 9th century Muhammad ibn Ziyad established the Ziyadid dynasty. This was also the time of the introduction of the Zaydi sect from Iraq - a group of Shia who accepted Zayd ibn Ali (Ali ibn Ali Talib), the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad; as the last legitimate successor to the Prophet. Ali was the first imam or leader of Shia’ism in all its forms. It was on the question of his ‘right to rule’ the Caliphate as the fourth rashidun (rightly guided caliphs) that lead to a major split in Islam, into the Sunni and Shia branches.
In the 15th century, Yemen was again in the centre of a new storm with their discovery of coffee as a stimulating beverage. As a result this, most of the 16th and 17th centuries saw the Yemen region transformed into a conflict zone with the Egyptians, the Ottomans, and various European powers seeking control of the emerging markets for Coffea arabica, as well as control over trade of condiments and spices from the East. The world lost interest in Yemen in the beginning of the 18th century when the preferred sea-route between Europe and Asia was around Africa, and the coffee plant had been taken out of Yemen to be transplanted to new, profitable locations from Asia to Americas.
In the 19th century, the determination of various European powers to establish a presence in the Middle-East, resulted in the British takeover of Aden in 1839, while the Ottoman empire occupied North Yemen; from where it had been driven out by the Yemenis two hundred years earlier. The interests of these two powers intensified in the region by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the re-emergence of the Red Sea route as the preferred passage between Asia and Europe. As the Ottomans expanded inland to establish themselves in Sanaa (the current capital of Yemen) and Ta’izz; the British expanded towards the North and East of Aden. The growing clashes between the British and the Ottomans along the non-demarcated border lead to the 1904 treaty that established the frontier between the Ottoman ruled North Yemen and the British possession of South Yemen.
With the departure of the Ottoman forces at the end of World War I in 1918, North Yemen became an independent country with Yahya Mahmud al-Mutawakil (the Imam of the Zaydis) as the de-facto ruler. He resuscitated the Zaydi claim to a ‘Historic Yemen’ which included Aden and other protectorates under British rule; as well as areas of the north that were being occupied by the expanding Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The areas of Asir province, Jizan and Najran oasis became the point of conflict between the Zaydi and the house of Saud (rulers of Saudi Arabia); while the British retained control of the south; which they considered as strategically and economically important to their own empire. Aden was of particular importance, since the British officials of the 1830s thought that a military base was necessary to prevent the French advance through Egypt and the Russian expansion through Persia. The then governor of Bombay, Sir Robert Grant (1834-1838) believed that India couldonly be protected by ‘preemptively seizing places of strength to protect the Indian Ocean’.
On 19 January 1839, the British Royal Marines landed in Aden to secure the territory, and by 1850 it was declared as a free trade port. The port of Eden lies equidistant from the Suez canal, Bombay (Mumbai) and Zanzibar (today a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania); all important British territories of trade at that time. Thus Aden became a crucial coal and water replenishment center for ships travelling from Europe to Asia, and remained under British control until November 1967.
By the end of World War II in 1945, a wide segment of the Yemeni society was up against Yahya Mahmud and in 1948 he was assassinated by a coalition of dissidents; who in turn were overthrown by Yahya’s son Ahmad, who installed himself as the new imam. Politically, the British continued to rule Aden and the protectorates in the north; but by 1965, seventeen of the 21 protectorate states had joined Saudi Arabia. The British announcement that independence of Yemen would ensue by 1968 unleashed violent political conflict as various parties fought for control of South Yemen.
Earlier, in September 1962, Imam Ahmed who was ruling the North part of Yemen died of natural causes, and his son Imam Muhammad al-Badr became the new ruler. Within weeks; elements of the military, supported by a variety of political parties, staged a coup and declared the foundation of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The new republic and its leader Abd Allah al-Sallal called upon Egypt for assistance and Egyptian troops and equipment arrived almost immediately to defend this regime. At the same time Saudi Arabia provided sanctuary and aid to the deposed imam al-Badr and his largely tribal loyalist forces. This can be considered the watershed instance in which Saudi Arabia got involved in the internal affairs of Yemen.
The establishment of a republic in North Yemen provided an incentive to Yemenis in the south to free themselves from the British. The Egyptians agreed to provide support to organizations campaigning for southern independence. However, with many organizations being suspicious of the dominant role that Egypt had begun to play in that region; a new and radical alternative, the Marxist oriented National Liberation Front (NLF) which drew its supporters from indigenous people of the south, came into existence. By the time of independence in late 1967, the NLF was the predominant political party and the British arranged for transfer of sovereignty to the NLF on 30 November 1967; and the ‘People’s Republic of South Yemen’ was formed.
Seeking financial and technical aid, this new nation sought help from the then Soviet Union; since neither the Western countries nor the Arab world showed any interest in its development. By the early 1970s South Yemen was firmly a Marxist state with communist thought process of society and economy. Ironically, it was renamed the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.
During this time the conflict in North Yemen; between imam al-Badr, supported by Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan, and the republicans; supported by Egypt, and Soviet Union had escalated into a civil war that continued till 1970. Britain, USA and the United Nations were also involved, even though only at the diplomatic level. Al- Sallal’s Egyptian backed regime was ousted in 1968 and replaced by a nominally civilian one of Abd al Rahman al Iryani; leading to the ‘Compromise of 1970’ - an agreement brokered by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This government lasted till 1974 and replaced by a military- led Council headed by Ibrahim al-Hamdi that began an era of national development. The assassinations of al-Hamdi in 1977, and his successor al-Ghashmi in 1978 were an indication of the ever existing power turmoil in the region. The successor to al-Ghashmi was Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh who managed to reconcile most of the factions and resume the development programs. He founded the General People’s Congress (GPC) party and consolidated his political career as President of North Yemen (1978-1990), and then as President of re-unified Yemen (1990-2012).
With both Yemen nations achieving independence, there were expectations for unification. This was not easily forth-coming due to the drastic differences in the political and economic policies of the two regimes. While North Yemen pursued market economy and trade ties with the West and Saudi Arabia; the south moved in a socialist direction under the NLF. These ideological and political differences lead to the border war of 1972 and another in 1979. During this time the NLF evolved into the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP). After internal power struggles that lasted till 1986, the YSP leadership was headed by moderate politicians led by Ali Salim al-Bayd and Haydar abu Bakr al-Attas; who undertook the task of the unification of two Yemens.
Sanaa was declared as the political capital of Unified Yemen and Aden to be the economic capital; though the new government inherited a country with a severe economic collapse and deprivation, especially since these conditions followed a short period of improved economic conditions that had led to soaring expectations of the people.
The indirect cause of the economic collapse of Yemen was the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Even with the importance of oil revenues of Yemen itself; their economy was heavily dependent on workers remittances and economic aid from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Yemen’s refusal to join the U.S-Saudi military coalition against Iraq prompted Saudi Arabia to expel a bulk of Yemeni workers there and to cut-off financial aid to Yemen. Despite this set-backs, the April 1993 legislative elections were held with international monitoring and were judged to be relatively free and fair. Unfortunately, the conflict between northern and southern political leaders worsened in late 1993 leading to the ‘War of Secession’ of 1994, which resulted in the defeat of the southern forces and a rout of the YSP party, leaving control of the country in the hands of the GPC-Islah (Islamic Reform Grouping) coalition dominated by President Saleh.
By late 1994 the economy of Yemen was in constant recession and the country had ceased to be economically viable or sustainable. The Saleh government realized that its non-demarcated border with Saudi Arabia remained a source of regional conflict, and that the restoration of the border issues with Saudi Arabia would improve relations between the two countries; allowing for the possibility of stabilizing the economy and restructuring it within a peaceful environment. The Saudi pressure on Yemen’s eastern border and border clashes during 1994, led to the January 1995 ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ to reaffirm the Taif treaty of 1934, which culminated into the June 2000 final border agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
On the economic front, from 1995 onwards till 2010 the sustainability and viability of Yemen’s economy was dependent on multistage World Bank and IMF financial aid packages, which the Saleh government successfully implemented in the last years of the 20th century. However, by the turn of the century there was an increasing lack of willpower to adhere to the IMF & World Bank’s demanding economic and governance measures linked to the aid packages. By 2005 the economy of Yemen was unable to create adequate jobs for the country’s rapidly growing population, while unemployment, malnutrition and poverty levels grew drastically.
The bombing of the American naval ship, the USS Cole in Aden port, followed by the al- Qaeda’s attack on the United States on 11 September 2001, dramatically changed Yemen’s relations with many countries, especially with the United States. With the rise of Islamic Jihadi forces in nearby Somalia, compounded by the realities of domestic policies within Yemen that were influenced by local nationalism, Islamic history, a growing anti-American sentiment; and given the central role of Yemini militant Islamic leaders in the local political balance of power, President Saleh was forced to navigate a difficult political path between these contradictory forces.
Yemen has a long and deep link to Islamic Jihad. The father of Osama bin Laden (founder of al-Qaeda) was originally from Wadi Hadramawt in Yemen and had migrated to Saudi Arabia. Many of the recruits for the Afghan War (the U.S and Saudi Arabia led efforts to fight the forces of the Soviet Union in its invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s) were hard-core Islamic Yemenis; and Afghanistan became the crucible of global Islamic jihad. When the Soviets withdrew from their failed Afghan adventure in 1989, these battle-hardened and radicalized Islamic fighters went home; while many of them, Yemeni and non-Yemeni, came to Yemen, drawn to its porous borders and vast tribal areas outside the control of the states. Many of these ‘Afghan-Arabs’ fought on the side of the Saleh government in the War of Secession in 1994, developing close ties with Saleh’s top leadership.
In 2003 and again in 2006, President Saleh decisively won the parliamentary elections with a majority, while the Islah and YSP, alongwith the Nasserites and smaller Zaydi parties formed an assertive opposition coalition; the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). Conflicting demands by foreign governments of the war-on-terror and the continuous problems facing Yemen’s society and economy, led to increasing dissatisfaction in the early 2000s. During this time, the al-Houthi rebellion was launched in 2004, in the north by Zaydi sayyids resulted in large casualties. President Saleh’s strong response resulted that the rebellion continued to re-erupt and defied efforts to reach a truce. In mid-2007, protests and demonstrations broke out in many places across southern Yemen. Initiated by military officials protesting their forced retirements and paltry pensions, their actions were joined in by civil servants, lawyers, other professionals and unemployed youth, protesting what they considered was a systematic discrimination against the south.
The Houthi’s are an armed Shia Muslim militia, and have their roots in a movement that started in northern Yemen in late 1980s to protect and revive Zaydi religious and cultural traditions. Zaydism is a branch of Shia Islam that’s different from the Twelver Shia-ism of Iran and Lebanon.
The rebellion in the north and violent protests in the south, brought the legitimacy of the Saleh government into question. Some protesters in the south began questioning the Yemeni unification itself, claiming that unification amounted to occupation. Crucially, supporters of the Houthi rebellion questioned the idea of a republic and called for the restoration of Islamic rule by the Zaydi sayyids. The Houthis were not the only ones creating instability in Yemen. The 17 September 2008 bombing of the U.S. Embassy that killed 16 people was the handiwork of al-Qaeda. The legitimacy and effective administration (or the lack of it) of the Saleh government was being challenged from every side.
When the 2011 Arab Spring, the wave of pro-democracy protests spread across the Arabic world, Yemen was one of the first to experience the uprising, with brutal consequences. Fueled by the already existing rebellion in all parts of country, the uprising evolved into a brutal civil war, agitated by intervention of foreign powers. Throughout the first quarter of 2011 those opposing the rule of President Saleh clashed with the security forces. On March 18 Saleh’s forces fired upon the protesters in Sana, killing around 50. On 20th March, General Al Mohsen al-Ahmar, commander of the 1st Armored Division, announced his support for the opposition and his intent to use troops to protect the protesters. The defection of al-Ahmar who was joined by several other senior officers, further increased the tensions in Sanaa; where military units of the defecting officers and those still loyal to Saleh; both deployed tanks and heavy weapons in key locations around the city.
As the unrest continued, security forces from the outlying provinces were brought into Sanaa to respond to the growing unrest; allowing militant groups in the provinces to regain their foothold. While the Houthi rebellion in the north gained strength, the Islamic terrorist group ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’ took control of several cities in the the province of Abyan. Despite intervention by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to broker a peace agreement between President Saleh and the opposition forces, Saleh’s habit of initially agreeing to the proposals and then rejecting them, caused the GCC to suspend its mediation efforts; and led to heavy fighting in Sanaa between pro-opposition tribal militias and troops loyal to Saleh, with dozens being killed. On 3rd June 2011, Saleh was injured in a bomb explosion meant to assassinate him. He was taken to Saudi Arabia for treatment and Vice-President Adb Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took over as acting president. After prolonged negotiations, Saleh signed an internationally mediated agreement that transferred power to Hadi, in exchange for immunity from prosecution.
Under the Hadi government Yemen remained deeply divided; facing challenges from Houthi rebels and al-Qaeda, with a dismal economy and soaring unemployment. Much of the country faced acute shortages of food, water and basic necessities. The ‘National Dialogue Conference’ that commenced in March 2013 and concluded in January 2014 failed to stop the recurring violence and instability continued. Hadi’s government faced new public discontent in July, after its policy of deep cuts in subsidies of fuel, with protests being mobilized by Houthi rebels. In September 2014, Yemeni security forces killed many protesters in Sanaa, escalating the confrontations. In late September, the Houthis took control of Sanaa, seizing key government offices. The United Nation (UN) brokered a peace agreement between Hadi and the Houthis, but the latter refused to withdraw from Sanaa until a prime minister of their choice was appointed. The Houthi occupation of the capital of Yemen and their foray into territories far from their northern stronghold, put them into conflict with other Yemeni factions, including al-Qaeda.
The fighting between government forces and the Houthi militia occupying Sana increased in January 2015 and on 21 January the Houthis overran the presidential palace, forcing the resignations from power of President Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah. The Houthis dissolved the parliament and announced a 5-member presidential council to form a transitional government. On 15 February, the UN Security Council issued a resolution condemning the actions of the Houthis and calling on them to return to the process outlined in the National Dialogue Conference. In late February, Hadi escaped from Sanaa and re-emerged in Aden, which was outside Houthi control, retracted his earlier resignation as president and asserted his right as the legitimate leader of Yemen. With his position in Aden remaining precarious, he appealed for international military intervention against the rebels. This intervention came in late March, when a Saudi Arabia led coalition of nine countries from West Asia and North Africa; comprising Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and elements of the American mercenary group Academi (formerly known as Blackwater) providing on-ground forces and aerial strike power; with Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia allowing the use of their air-space, territorial waters and military bases; and the United States providing intelligence, logistical support and accelerated sales of weapons to the coalition forces, as well as direct aerial strikes against AQAP. Britain and the U.S deployed their military personnel in the command-and-control center responsible for targeted Saudi-led airstrikes on Yemen.
The Houthis were supported by former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was still an important player in Yemen politics. The Saudi-led air-strikes succeeded in enabling pro-Hadi forces to retake control in July 2015. Coalition forces helped them to drive the Houthis out of most of southern Yemen. The coalition did found it very difficult to dislodge the Houthis from northern Yemen, including Sanaa. Saudi-led aerial bombing raids killed thousands of civilians and severely damaged Yemen’s infrastructure, but failed to loosen the Houthi’s grip on the capital. This ‘war’ was widely criticized and its effect was described as a humanitarian catastrophe. Many have described it as a genocide. Whether this intervention is in compliance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is still in dispute.
In late 2017, the Houthi- Saleh alliance ended when Saleh announced his intentions to hold peace talks with the Saudi coalition. Violence followed between Houthis and pro-Saleh troops for control of the capital. On 04 December, Saleh was killed by Houthi forces in Sanaa. In southern Yemen, secessionist forces allied to Hadi demanded that he sack his government. When Hadi refused, they took over Aden, followed by fighting between the secessionists and pro-Hadi forces; while both were part of the Saudi-led coalition. The coalition mediated to end this crisis and forced a stale-mate. In June 2018 the Saudi-led coalition advanced on Al-Hudaydah, a Houthi held port city, in an effort to leverage the Houthis for peace talks and to negotiate a deal to end the civil war. However, the port being a life-line for humanitarian aid, the United Nations intervened to negotiate a cease-fire agreement, which was reached on 13 December 2018. The cease-fire remained fragile, with different parties to this agreement accusing each other of breach of its terms. Intermittent fighting and theft of UN aid continued through till June 2019, when the United Arab Emirates began disengaging from the Yemen conflict as victory for the coalition looked unlikely.
Fighting between the Saudis and the Houthis continued till the Covid-19 pandemic spread globally. Faced with an economic uncertainty due to free-fall in oil prices and concerns over the inability of the warring factions in Yemen to handle the pandemic outbreak there, Saudi Arabia announced a unilateral cease-fire in April 2020.
However, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains a major player in war-torn Yemen and a regional threat, with the potential to being a global threat. New leadership, its core characteristics as a fighting force and its ongoing fighting experience in Yemen allow this terrorist organization the capability to strike on multiple fronts. In February 2020, AQAP’s leader Qasim al-Rimi was killed in a U.S. drone strike. AQAP’s new commander Khalid bin Umar Batarfi inherits a organization that has been depleted by U.S. counter-terrorism campaigns in collaboration with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2016 the UAE led an international efforts to expel AQAP from the city of al-Mukalla, the largest city controlled by the group in Yemen.
The new leader of AQAP, Batarfi; may have been appointed to lead AQAP’s efforts because he is from the Arabian peninsula and also has extensive credentials in international jihad. Batarfi is a key player in AQAP plans to take advantage of the chaos in Yemen. Al-Qaeda’s success is less related to its military strength and more in securing hospitality and endorsements from key tribal leaders and passive tolerance of the locals. Its efforts in brand-building, community development projects and engagement with the youth have played a role in AQAP’s population integration strategy. To understand the importance of AQAP’s strategy it is worth comparing it to that of Daesh (ISIS), which relied mostly on bold military operations to inspire fear and forced support from the locals, but did not produce anything substantial by way of culture-specific narratives or community engagement, thereby failing to displace the AQAP. Batarfi and the AQAP is likely to become a long-term and dangerous enemy in that region. Yemen’s long and porous border with Saudi Arabia makes it a ideal launch-pad to attack a prime enemy, the House of Saud; the family that rules Saudi Arabia. Given the hostility of the Yemenis towards Saudi Arabia and its military intervention, AQAP will attempt to recruit more Yemenis to its cause while fine-tuning its mission against the al-Saud family. As regional and global powers re-focus on other priorities, Yemen continues to offer significant opportunities to AQAP to strengthen its presence on the ground in the coming future and also to use Yemen as a base to revive its jihadi operations in the Gulf region.
The other important player in the politics of Yemen is China. China and the Arab Republic of Yemen (northern part of Yemen) established ministerial level diplomatic relations from 24th September 1956. With the formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen (southern part of Yemen), China established ambassadorial level diplomatic relationship from 31 January 1968. After the unification of Yemen, the date of establishment of bilateral diplomatic relationship was set as 24 September 1956.
China’s position on Yemen is driven by its interest in maintaining strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. While not taking a prominent leadership role in the Yemen conflict, China has supported international and regional initiatives to mitigate the conflict. As Yemen’s major trade partner, China has a strong economic presence in Yemen and seeks a significant role in Yemen’s post-war construction through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite China’s historical ties with both north and south Yemen, bi-lateral ties with Saudi Arabia have been given prominence by China, due to Saudi’s role as a major oil supplier and a regional focal point for the BRI. The two countries have publicly emphasized mutual respect for each other; with Saudi Arabia firmly supporting China’s stance on Taiwan, Xinjiang and South China sea, and China respecting and supporting Saudi political and security interests in Yemen.
China had a muted response to Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen. While it did not support this military action, it did not confront Saudi Arabia or its military supporters the U.S and Britain over Yemen, and supported all UN Security Council resolutions on the Yemen conflict. China has tried to bridge the trust deficit between the Houthis and the UN after communications between the two sides broke down over the control of Hudaydah port. Although, China’s mediation efforts were unsuccessful, the Houthis did thank China for its objective and impartial stance on the Yemen issue and assured China of their willingness to maintain close communications in future. Apart from millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to Yemen during its years of conflict, China will likely be a prominent player in its post-war reconstruction. In November 2019, China urged the international community to offer assistance to Yemen by focusing on easing Yemen’s oil crisis and helping the livelihood of Yemenis by stabilizing their local currency; while supporting reconstruction and developmental projects that increase employment.
There is no doubt that China’s ambitious BRI will gain advantage when Yemen achieves stability, since most of China’s trade with Europe passes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, while Chinese import of oil from Middle-East and Africa transit through the Strait of Hormuz. While Yemen is not of direct importance to China, the country occupies a strategic position due to its close proximity to international shipping lanes. Peace and stability in Yemen would allow China to resume its pre-war investments in trade and construction and allow Yemen to play a ‘economically active role’ in China’s belt and road initiative.
With this view-point, China has developed a connection of trust with the Houthis, while its official position is to support the Hadi government as the legitimate government of Yemen. Chinese diplomats continue to have routine meetings with all parties in the war-zone of Yemen, given China’s ambition to benefit long-term from Yemen’s Geo-strategic location; and to use its ports to connect with the ‘silk road’ ports of Gwadar (Pakistan) and in Djibouti, where China has financed and built Africa’s biggest port which is also its first overseas naval base. Since trade, investment, politics and military are all linked closely to China’s foreign policy; the Chinese long-term plan in Yemen is based on the importance of the port of Aden which enjoys an ideal natural location and shortens the shipping distances by hundreds of miles. China also has a keen interest in the military base on the Yemeni island of Miyun, near the entrance to the Bab-al Mandeb strait as part of its strategy to boost its military-naval presence on the Red Sea. This island has the potential to support the Chinese naval presence in Djibouti, making Bab-el Mandeb a key maritime choke-point.
India’s diplomatic relationship with Yemen was established in November 1967, when the British departed that country. Since 2014, the Indian government of Sh.Narendra Modi has been developing stronger relationships with all major players in the Middle-East; balancing its diplomacy between the Sunni majority GCC countries and Shia majority Iran, while ensuring stronger relationships with Israel; essentially bridging diplomatic relationships across the Sunni, Shia and Jewish divide. However India has taken a spectators role in the Yemen conflict, and apart from contributing food assistance in form of rice and wheat worth US$ 2 million in August 2012 and March 2013 respectively and providing medical assistance in 2015 and December 2017 worth US$ 1 million, respectively; its only other role is being a member of ‘Friends of Yemen’ (FOY) Group; which was established in London UK, in January 2010 at a meeting co-chaired by United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and Republic of Yemen. The FOY Group has 39 countries and international organizations that include IMF, World Bank and United Nations as members, among others. The last FOY meeting was in New York, USA in September 2014, on the sidelines of the 69th session of the UN General Assembly.
The last official communication by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs was on 10 April 2020 where; in response to queries on the ceasefire in Yemen, the official spokesperson Mr. Anurag Srivastava said: "India welcomes the announcement of ceasefire and hopes that cessation of hostilities will lead to resumption of political dialogue leading to peace and stability in Yemen and the region. This will also help Yemen to join the global community to deal with Covid-19."
Given the potential of Islamic terrorist threat to India from Deash (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and its various affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan; India will have to take an active part in developing friendly and trusted communications channels with all local Yemeni parties involved in the conflict. India has a old and credible reputation for its non-violent and peaceful policies. Inroads into Yemen should be through the spheres of direct humanitarian aid, medical aid and construction of cottage hospitals, and technology to deliver potable water to their people. As long as these efforts are not linked to any potential business opportunities in the re-construction of Yemen, the reputation of India as a saviour of people will be consolidated in the minds of Yemeni population. Friendly and trusted communications also mean that Indian intelligence will have multiple sources of reliable and actionable information inputs that would enable stronger defense against Islamic terrorism.
“Bharat has the indelible philosophy and deep rooted study of life to understand human behavior in difficult situations, the most desperate and unbelievable situations faced by humans; and the ability to find solutions”.
Originally posted in FINS Journal
20/10/ 2020
